From the mid-1940s to early 1950s, Morrell officials had reasserted their prerogatives over production decisions through the creation of an industrial engineering department and the appointment of supervisors willing to challenge the union's power. In December 1953 Morrell's board of directors selected a new president, W. W. McCallum, the first non-Morrell family member to be president in the company's 126-year history. McCallum was bent not only on wresting power away from Local No. 1 but also on implementing strategies that would shift production away from the Ottumwa plant. McCallum's financial and production strategies, combined with changes prompted by the transformation of the meatpacking industry in the 1950s and 1960s, undermined Local No. l's militancy.
Internal disputes within Local No. 1 were just as important in the erosion of the imion's militancy during the 1950s and 1960s. Discord started during and immediately following World War II, when Morrell hired many rural workers to meet its expanded labor needs. These and other workers who started working at the plant following World War II were largely unsympathetic to the sentiments underlying Local No. l's militancy. Largely unaccustomed to unionism and not part of the packing community traditions of the local's founders, they subverted the union's efforts to block changes in work rules dictated by the conipany in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The union would undergo further fragmentation during the 1960s, when women workers, whose concerns had long been ignored by the local's male leadership, battled for job equality in the plant. The erosion of Local No. l's militancy left it virtually powerless when Morrell prepared to close its Ottumwa plant in the early 1970s. As one longtime Morrell worker put it, these were the years when "Ottumwa went to the dogs."M ORRELL WORKERS in Ottumwa received the first CIO packinghouse union charter in the United States in May 1937. In 1943, in recognition of that status, the CIO designated their local as UPWA Local No. 1, a designation members would point to proudly in years to come. The local emerged out of a closeknit and culturally uniform neighborhood in the immediate environs of the Morrell plant in Ottumwa's east end. As early as 1900, 60 percent of Morrell's workers were native-bom of native parents. By the mid-1930s, over 95 percent of Morrell's workers were native-bom of northern and western European stock. Many attended fundamentalist Protestant churches and belonged to the Eagles, Moose, and American Legion halls situated in the city's blue-collar residential areas, including the east end.B etween 1938 and the end of World War II, Ottumwa's Morrell workers were able to secure favorable informal production rules in key departments of the plant. One of the most important of those agreements concerned the number of cattle killed per hour by the floorsmen. Beginning in the late 1930s, after confrontations stemming from sit-down strikes, the beef department superintendents and foremen agreed to abide by limits proposed by workers in the department. Job load issues were largely resolved this way in many departments throughout the plant at the same time. As a result, the union exercised considerable power. In 1942, however, Morrell established a counteroffensive. The company introduced a new industrial engineering department that took production decisions away from departniental supervisors who had previously negotiated informal production rules with the local union. In 1947 Morrell also hired a new plant superintendent, Charles L. Campbell, who directly confronted the urüon over production-related issues through 1952.2 . Por more information on Ottumwa's workers' social and cultural identification, see Wilson J. Warren, "The Limits of New Deal Social Democracy: Structural Pluralism in Midwestem Meatpacking, 1900 -1955 " (Ph.D. diss.. University of Pittsburgh, 1992 , 131-32, 319-20, 330, 604; and idem, " The Heyday of the CIO in Iowa: Ottumwa's Meatpacking Workers, 1937 -1954 ," Annals of Iowa 51 (1992 , 365-67. 3 . On the history of union-management conflict in Morrell's Ottumwa plant between 1937 and 1954, see Warren, "The Heyday of the CIO in Iowa," 363-89. For a more detailed account of this coriflict, see Warren, "The Limits of New Deal Social Democracy, . For detailed accounts of the establishment of the beef department job load and other informal production rules, see Virgil Barücson, interview with author, 26 September 1982; During that six-year period, Campbell and the industrial engineering department initiated many changes in work rules, most of which increased job loads. For exam.ple, beginning in 1949, Morrell demanded that Ottumwa's beef kill department slaughter twice as many cattle per hour as the company's Sioux Falls plant did with the same number of men. Union officials in Ottumwa complained that Morrell unfairly targeted Ottumwa's CIO work force while avoiding antagonizing Sioux Falls's more cooperative Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen (AMCBW-AFL) work force. In this case, Campbell told the Ottumwa local that if they did not like the job load situation, then "why don't you strike?" Throughout this period, the local used wildcat strikes to combat the changes in work rules. Edward Filliman, weekly reports, 26 March, 30 April, 7 May 1949 , 2 and 30 December 1950 , 6 January, 10 February, 7 July, and 17 November 1951 To be sure, many UPWA local unions' relations with the intemational office became strained following World War II, partly because of the union's losing battle in its 1948 nationwide strike. The UPWA had gained a 16-cents-per-hour increase following its 1946 strike, but after a long and bitter strike in 1948, the union, which had pushed for a twenty-nine-cents-per-hour increase, settled for nine cents. In Omaha, local union officials had expressed ambivalence about the need for a strike even before it began. Then once it did begin, workers attacked each other over left-wing ideological issues. Whites often blamed black workers for crossing picket lines. Omaha's packers, especially Wilson, exacerbated internal union tensions by granting replacement workers seniority (so-called "superseniority") over the UPWA strikers when they returned to work. Other UPWA cities experienced similar internal union problems. also resented hot-headed local stewards, some of whom he claimed led walkouts just so they could go "squirrel hunting." Finally, while many prewar urüon activists viewed unionism as a kind of "religion" that would reshape power relations in the plant and the local community, McCoy believed that his generation of younger workers simply wanted to work to put bread on the table for their families.' A significant subtheme of McCoy's characterization of the pro-Filliman faction was his dislike of their drinking habits. He believed that too often Filliman and his compatriots (including William Fletcher, first president of the local and the local's president again in 1952, and Harold "Cap" [or "Cappy"] Carson, a local union officer since World War II) plotted their walkouts from two beer "joints," Walker's and Champ's, located across the street from the plant. It is no coincidence that Walter Walker and Orvel Champ, whose families ran those bars, had helped to organize the CIO local at the plant and had been among its first officers.'" As later events would make more evident, however, McCoy's observation signified a deeper (and more damaging) gulf in atü-tudes between the remaining core of old-fime, militant activists, whose attitudes about Morrell had been shaped in the preWorld War II years, and the new generation, including workers like McCoy, who had started in the plant during or immediately after the war. In particular, the older, militant lordonists feared that any deviation from their hardline stance against the company would result in a retum to the "old days." Years later, men in the older, militant camp-men such as Virgil Bankson, a longtime chief steward-would describe with an undertone of fear and hatred the arbitrary and calloused treatment they received before the rise of the urüon. In the eyes of younger workers who had not experienced the pre-imion period at the January 1955, 12; and Packinghouse Worker, February 1955,11. 10. Jack McCoy, interview, Waterloo, 18 May 1983, ILHOP. Morrell plant, the older, more militant unionists seemed motivated more by vindictiveness and revenge against the company than by a desire for social justice."
The generational gap overlapped with differences arising from the urban versus rural distribution of the work force. The older, more militant workers still tended to reside in the immediate plant environs of Ottumwa's east end, whereas many more recently hired employees (including younger union officials such as McCoy) lived across the river on Ottumwa's south side or outside of town. These sources of discord would continue to resonate in the union's internal politics throughout the 1950s, especially in the face of the policies that Morrell's new top official pursued. lack of experience toiling with meat or handling packing workers represented another contrast with the Fosters. McCallum had been Oscar Mayer's accountant and president's assistant since 1938, but unlike the Fosters, who had always worked in the plant for at least a token stint of hands-on experience before assuming top managerial positions, McCallum's financial wizardry was his sole credential. When he met with the local union executive board and stewards soon after his ascension to Morrell's top position, McCallum "stressed the fact that he wishe [d] to see a closer harmony between the employees and the company." Nevertheless, at the supposedly conciliatory "Morrell Days" celebration in April 1954, he made an implicit (and threatening) connection between Morrell's finances and its workers' militancy. "The Ottumwa plant," he said, "is, in a sense, at a standstill. We are killing hogs and cattle, processing and selling good meat products, paying wages and so forth-but the plant is losing money-and has been losing consistently over the last six years," that is, since the 1948 strike and its subsequent repercussions in labor-management relations." Most were nonunion and paid relatively low wages, but they did boost Morrell's total sales from just over $300 million in 1954 to $554 million in 1961. During the same period, Morrell also acquired financial interests in Foxbilt, a livestock feed and hybrid corn producer, and Golden Sun Mill, another livestock feed manufacturer.^* McCallum's decision to pursue such a strategy would prove to be antiquated, however, once Iowa Beef Processors' revolutionary combination of more isolated, rural slaughtering facilities, nonunion work forces, and streamlined, on-rail, boxed-beef technology rapidly transformed meatpacking (and its profit margins) beginning in 1961. When Currier Holman and Andy Anderson started their Denison, Iowa, plant, meatpacking was still largely typified by urban midwestern locations where animals were shipped on the "hoof," although the transition from urban to rural locations to decrease shipping costs had been occurring gradually since the end of World War I. IBP's real innovations were in the introduction of highly automated assembly line production techniques in combination with the development of "boxed" beef. Various firms had introduced automated techniques piecemeal in the 1950s but not in the integrated way that IBP did. Boxed beef referred to the cutting of beef carcass quarters into marketable cuts at the plant instead of having retail butchers handle this step as had been the traditional practice. Most of the old-line plants were imionized 14. On McCallum's financial strategy for Morrell, see National Provisioner, 21 August 1954, 25; Morrell Magazine, September 1954, 3; July 1955, 6; January 1956, 10; February 1956, 11; June 1956, 3; October 1959, 2; January 1960, 2; May 1960,2; January 1962,2; June 1962,4; January-February 1963,2; JanuaryFebruary 1964, 3; and May-June 1964, 15. as well, whereas, partly because IBP's technical processes did not require skilled labor, they could hire unskilled, nonurüorüzed workers. Much to the surprise of Morrell and other tradifional packers, IBP's integrated producfion practices soon left them scram^bling to innovate or be eliminated as compefitors.^B esides choosing outdated financial and producfion strategies, McCallum exacerbated volafile employee relations at the plant by selecting Harry E. Hansel Jr. to help manage the confrontafional industrial relafions department that Charles "Mad Dog" Campbell had administered from 1947 to 1952. "Kid" Hansel, as the old-fime urüonists derisively called him, had started working at the Ottumwa plant in 1940. In 1942 he was transferred to the new industrial engineering department. Over the next decade, he helped to establish fime studies and gain fime to challenge Local No. l's power to control producfion decisions. Gain fime, in parficular, became an effecfive weapon that management wielded to deflect workers' allegiances away from Local No. 1. Essenfially, gain fime was a variafion on the old Frederick Winslow Taylor nofion of incenfive pay (or piecework) that allowed employees to work shorter hours for the same pay as long as they met the producfion standard for the job. In effect, workers who parficipated in gain fime pracficed a self-induced job speedup. Through 1960, when he was transferred away from Ottumwa, Hansel, as operafions manager and assistant manager of a revamped industrial relafions depart- ment, wholeheartedly protected the practice of gain fime and gain fimers themselves.^M cCallum and Hansel's continued assaults on the local union's power to affect workplace decisions resulted in a resurgence of union aggressiveness beginning in 1955. " Cap" Carson, Local No. 1 president in 1955 and 1956 , led a new charge by the old-time militant faction of the work force against management's directives. In The Bulletin, the union's newspaper, leadership waged a propaganda battle, as fierce as the one it had conducted in 1949-1952, against Morrell and its policies. The paper attacked "Kid" Hansel in particular, accusing him of undermining the union contract, including seniority provisions.^D uring the first half of 1956, virtually the same group of older, militant officers from 1955 continued to press Morrell on gain time. Union officials recalled the period from 1949 to 1952, when workers had been fired for failing to meet new production standards. They urged the rank and file to resist gain time incentives, because new standards could result in further job losses and consequent loss of vmion power. As evidence. Local No. 1 officials pointed to Morrell's shutdown of the dog food manufacturing department in December 1955 based on time study conclusions. The department was small, but they believed the same thing would happen soon all over the plant. ^Ô fficials also noted the deceit of the company slogan adopted at the 1954 "Morrell Days" celebration-"Morrell Needs You and You Need Morrells"-in light of the new company policy of discharging employees or delaying sick pay for absenteeism 16 . For details about Harwel's career, see Morrell Magazine, March 1944, 8; August 1955, 6; October 1956, 8; and September 1962, 3 For instance, the February 18 issue asked union members to follow the correct sick pay procedures. The spirit of the brief article was that the local union needed to comply more cooperatively with the general provisions of its contract with Morrell. Nevertheless, regarding gain time, the new leadership continued the older, more militant leaders' viewpoint. A May 6 article in
The Bulletin asked the rank and file not to use the incentive system since "greed cuts [your] brothers throat" and denies work to everyone.B y May 1957, the older militants in Local No. 1 attempted to regain power. At the imion's regular membership meeting on May 14, a motion by John Bedner, vice-president of the local in 1955 and a member of the local's bargaining board in 1956, seconded by Art Johnson, proposed to lift the local's receivership. The motion carried. A similar proposal carried at a special executive board meeting of the local two days later. Over the next couple of weeks, however, as the UPWA district office stalled on the local's request, the older militants heard rumors that Tom Cohagan, on orders from Dave Hart, was planning to print a detailed plea for retaining the local's receivership. Sure enough, this plea, printed in the Jxme 3 issue of The Bulletin, noted that the "old tmion leaders, many of whom were recently defeated," wanted to lift the administratorship, without which, from Cohagan's point of view, the local would return to the "old days when 87 of-towners was gone largely because the local imion itself no longer contested company production decisions. Yet local union leaders' irritation about the importation of workers from outside Ottumwa was still evident enough in 1962 when The Bulletin noted that McCallum had been quoted as saying "out of towners are more efficient than Ottumwa people if they were hired in the last nine years" (that is, since the begirming of his tenure as president). Company officials lauded the progress they saw in replacing old east end homes with parking lots, a project made both possible and necessary because of ti\e transition in employees' places of residence. After the demolifion and burrüng, Morrell officials claimed that more than ten acres of parking were available to plant employees!^*
The number of people employed in the Ottumwa plant had been affected by Morrell's use of new technologies in combination with gain time since the early post-World War II years. Yet wholesale job losses at the Ottumwa plant did not cause widespread tension among workers until the early 1960s. Although 39,100 jobs were eliminated in meatpacking throughout the United States between 1956 and 1961, union membership at Morrell remained constant through most of the 1950s. As the pace of technological innovation picked up in the early 1960s, however, there were job losses at Morrell as well as at many other "old-line" meatpackers. Paul Bissell, beef department superintendent beginning in 1956 after working his way up through the ranks in the beef kill starting in 1930, recalled that new technologies transformed Ottumwa's beef killing process only after 1961. Until that date, "as far as beef operations were concerned, little had changed back to the '30s. "^2 Although The Bulletin emphasized losses in traditionally male-dominated departments such as the beef kill, some of the hardest hit departments, such as sliced bacon, had been predominately female. Unfortunately for those women. Local No. 1, like most UPWA locals, had adopted a system of departmental, as opposed to plantwide, seniority in order to prevent management's arbitrary transfer of workers, particularly union activists, from department to department. Because most packing departments were sex-segregated, this meant that women had little opportvinity to "bump" into male-dominated departments when technological innovations eliminated many women s jobs.
By 1964-65, more layoffs and continued pressure from longtime women employees presented Local No. l's leadership with a dilemma. How could they help women union members without alienating male workers, especially when men had long dominated the plant's work force and were its most ardent union activists? In 1935, women constituted just 9 percent of Morrell's work force compared to 15 percent in 1951 arid 14 percent in 1957. Only one woman (Mary Shoemaker from the sausage department) had ever been elected an official of Local No. 1. Moreover, most of the local's union leaders were admittedly sexist. Jesse Merrill, a hog kill worker and president of Local No. 1 from 1967 until the plarit closed in 1973, claimed he had long believed that "if the man's head of the house he should have the job." Virgil Bankson, Local No. l's chief steward during the 1960s, was even more adamantly Paul Bissell on 10 January 1983 (notes in my possession). On the restructuring and job cuts in meatpacking, see Fehn, "'Chickens Come Home to Roost': Industrial Reorganization, Seniority, and Gender Conflict in the United Packinghouse Workers of America, 1956 -1966 ," Labor History 34 (1993 , 333, 341. The Bulletin described job losses due to technological and time study changes in its issues of 11 and 25 March 1963 , and 30 March 1964 . See also "Facts and Figures," vol. 14, no. 21, 27 July 1961 against giving "men's jobs" to women. He claimed "there's more divorces over women taking men's jobs than anything else." In the face of such attitudes, women started attending local uruon meetings en masse in 1964-65 to protest the union's continuing conunitment to departmental serüority, but they made little headway with union leaders.^' After getting nowhere with the local, thirty women contacted the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in Washington, D.C. The Washington ofHce told them to approach David Dutton, a Waterloo attorney and civil rights activist. Dutton then contacted the UPWA international, threaterüng a lawsuit on the women's behalf if Local No. 1 did not follow the guidelines established by the 1964 Civil Rights Act's Title VII prohibiting sex discrimination. UPWA international officials promptly pressured Local No. 1 to adopt the so-called ABC serüority plan. "A" jobs were the most physically demanding and thus of interest mostly to men. "B" jobs-light work in relatively clean conditions-were reserved for women. "C" jobs were open to both men and women. When the new serüority system was finally put into place in March 1966, however, Ottumwa's male workers either refused to cooperate with it or conspired to undermine women's efforts to tackle "C" jobs. After two weeks, many women concluded that union officials were hindering the implementation of the new plan. In April 29. For comparative statistics on the percentages of men and women workers in midwestem meatpacking, see Warren, "The Limits of New Deal Social Democracy," Appendix B. Dennis A. Deslippe, "'We Had an Awful Time with Our Women': Iowa's Urüted Packinghouse Workers of America, 1945 -1975 ," Journal of Women's History 5 (1993 , 13-14, notes that before passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, women made up just 13 percent of the membership in UPWA District 3 as opposed to 21 percent throughout the entire imion. Ottumwa was even more thoroughly a bastion of male packing workers than many other midwestem plants. In 1950, for instance, the Rath plant in Waterloo employed 23 percent female workers and Armour in Mason City employed 26 percent. The Ottumwa statistics come from Ottumwa city directories for 1935, 1951, and 1957 . My information on Mary Shoemaker comes from her obituary (Ottumwa Courier, 18 February 1991) . For the sexism issue, see Jesse Merrill, interview, Ottumwa, 16 September 1981, ILHOP; and Virgil Bankson, ILHOP interview, quoted in Stromquist, Solidarity and Survival, 231 . For more on the women's struggles at the Ottumwa plant, see Fehn, "'Chickens Come Home to Roost, and idem, "Striking Women, formal lawsuit vmder the Civil Rights Act's Title Vü.^" Less obvious to many outsiders and subsequent observers of the battle of sexes at the Morrell plant was the local union's concern that management, especially the union's old nemesis Harry Hansel, hoped to use this issue to splinter the union. After a two-year stint from 1960 to 1962 as manager of Morrell's plant in Philadelphia, Hansel moved to the main offices in Chicago as a member of the corporate personnel and public relations department. In 1965-66, when the ABC plan was debated and the women's grievances were aired, MorreU sent Hansel to negotiate with Local No. 1 officials. Ethel Jerred, chief steward in the sliced bacon department, later recalled that "Harry Hansel tried to help [the women]," but union officials, especially Merrill and Bankson, blocked his efforts. Yet Jerred also revealed the company's lackluster commitment to the women's efforts by noting that "the company would prefer to hire new people from outside town rather than move women with as much as twenty-eight years seniority" into open jobs.^Ĥ istorian Dennis Deslippe has further contended that UPWA international officers were sexist in defending the ABC seniority plan. In Deslippe's view, UPWA President Ralph Helstein "still embraced . . . protective labor laws for women," since Helstein argued that women could not handle the physical aspects of many packing jobs. The Federal District Court in Des Moines effectively sidestepped the discrimination debate when it threw out the women's case on a technicality. The court then gave Morrell time to reach a settlement with the women. On July 12,1968, the court found Morrell in compliance with Title VII, and Morrell settled with each of the twenty-one women for $450.''3 0. Fehn, "'Chickens Come Home to Roost, '" 334, 337-39 buying Vickers Petroleum, Playtex, and STP in the 1960s and '70s. AMK took over Morrell by buying 33 percent of its overvalued stock. Eli Black, president of AMK, later claimed, "we bought a dollar for 25 cents." Consequently, AMK, originally a producer of milk bottle caps with sales of $40 million in 1967, took over a company with $800 million in sales.^* Although McCallum's purchase of numerous small packing plants and relocation of Morrell's headquarters from Ottumwa to Chicago may have diverted much needed funds away from modernizing the Ottumwa plant, at least while Morrell remained independent it had not taken active steps to close the Ottumwa plant. AMK had no such qualms, though. AMK VicePresident Morton H. Broffman explained the company's policies in regard to Morrell as "tough-minded management action." President Eli Black criticized McCallum for his outdated production planning methods and for using each of Morrell's plants as "individual profit centers" with "no central plant control."^Â MK's message to the Ottum^wa plant was modernize or else, and the rank and file felt compelled to respond cooperativelyLocal union leaders initially balked when Harry Hansel came to Ottumwa in the fall of 1969 and armounced that Morrell would spend $6.5 million to modernize the plant if the union would freeze its severance pay. After some debate, however, the union finally agreed. Further dramatizing how far it had strayed from its militant traditions, the leaders of Local P-1 (as the local was renamed after the 1968 merger of the UPWA into the AMCBW) agreed for the first time in its history to train their own people in time study methods so they could abide by Morrell's modernization (and layoff) plans. In contrast. Jack Moses, a veteran industrial engineer at the plant, later noted that the chief steward at Morrell's plant in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, a longtime AMCBW stronghold, had always been trained in time studies methods. "He even checked his own men with a stopwatch." During late 1970 and 1971, the Ottumwa local also agreed to company plans for wholesale layoffs in the sliced bacon, canning, beef, and pork divisions. About six hundred people were laid off in the pork division alone in 1971.'B y early 1973, however, word was out that the Ottumwa plant would close in July. Jesse Merrill and Harold Trimble, chief steward in 1973, conveyed their utter frustration with Morrell and its new president, Elias Paul, in a frank letter to Patrick Gorman, secretary-treasurer of the AMCBW.
In 1970, we thought, the Company was sincere in trying to make the plant go, so we conceded to freeze our severance pay rate and credited service at the 1970 level, only to find out their intentions weren't honorable. We gave them 11 percent more kill, cutting of hogs [that is, a faster pace in the kill and cut departments], beef with modernization, and lost people besides. God knows we tried and we find him [Paul] crying on your shoulder for more concessions. ... If people like him make it to heaven, than [sic] we know there is no one in hell and it is a myth. Gorman responded in patronizing fashion. Paul "was not crying on my shoulder," he replied; he seemed sincerely saddened by the imminent closing. Gorman suggested, moreover, that Merrill and Trimble should be ashamed for writing him in a way that suggested that they did not "care a hoot whether the plant closes or not." Paul's letter to Gorman was even more revealing. Although Paul noted in passing his "concern about the impact on the employees at Ottumwa and the impact on the town of 36. The Bulletin, 24 February, 23 and 30 November 1970, 8 February and 9 April 1971 ; Jack Moses, interview with author, 12 September 1982 (notes in author's possession); and Merrill, ILHOP interview.
Ottumwa" if the plant closed, he went on to excuse Morrell of ultimate responsibility for its demise.
John Morrell and Co. has been taking money from other locations for niost of these past twenty-five years and putting it into Ottumvy^a in an attempt to tum the [plant's losses] around. There is little point in pursuing the wisdom of this past action at this later date, but I believe we all would agree the company has tried hard to solve a difficult problem. I'm sure that Üie company's patience with this trying situation has always been tempered by the effects that any drastic action would have had on the welfare of the commurüty and on the individual employees involved.^'' One is left to wonder about the precise meaning of Paul's statement about the "company's patience with this trying situation." Yet it seems likely that in part he was castigating Ottumwa's militant union tradition.
TO THIS DAY, veterans of Ottumwa's long post-World War II labor-management struggles continue to debate the real reasons for the plant's closing. Many management and imion leaders agree that by the 1960s the Ottumwa plant was clearly outdated in terms of design efficiency. Lawrence Reedquist, a longtime traffic engineer, emphasized the irony that Morrell had built the plant to last "one hundred years" without knowing that by the 1960s new-line packing companies such as Iowa Beef Processors were building plants to last "no more than 40 years." Although it was equipped with the most up-to-date system of elevators and internal conveyance systems, the Ottumwa plant by the 1960s consisted of dozens of separate, mulfistory buildings that defied modern processes of packing disassembly. Many workers had to be employed simply to truck products between the various buildings. Still, Jack Moses, another longtime Morrell supervisor, pointed to Morrell's continued operation of its (now seriously downsized) packing plant in Sioux Falls. There, with buildings nearly as old as the Ottumwa facility, Morrell continues to turn out millions of dollars worth of meat products. As Mickey Lauria and Peter S. Fisher point 37. Merrill and Trimble to Gorman, 6 May 1973; Gorman to Merrill and Trimble, 11 May 1973; Paul to Gorman, 24 April 1973, box 11, Local P-1 Records. out in their study of plant closings in Iowa, "any given plant cannot be said to be obsolete in any absolute sense; it could be made efficient at some cost." Moses, as well as many former Ottumwa workers, believed Morrell kept the Sioux Falls plant open because its AMCBW-affiliated work force had long been more cooperative on production issues.^* An examination of the specific causes of the Ottumwa plant's ultimate demise would be fodder for another study. Nevertheless, it appears plausible that the erosion of workers' militancy allowed Morrell to decide the fate of the plant without much opposition. Local P-l's internal divisions and the complacency this created meant that workers were unable to apply much pressure on Morrell or city authorities to do much to keep the plant open. In 1969 Local P-1 and other Ottumwa union members formed the Greater Ottumwa Labor Development (GOLD) Corporation to push for greater involvement by labor in Morrell's future as well as in the city's post-Morrell plans. Yet by 1972 GOLD members complained that their occasional requests for information and input had usually been ignored by city and corporate authorities. Ottumwa's predicament contrasted noticeably with Waterloo's case in the late 1970s. There, public officials and local union members worked diligently to keep the Rath packing plant open.^' Local P-l's internal discord generated considerable bitterness among workers once the plant closed. Just as many former management personnel claimed, some of those who joined the union in the post-World War II years, such as Jack McCoy and Jesse Merrill, blamed the militant unionists for the plant's fate.
While appreciative of the role the local's militancy had played in establishing significant gains for its members, McCoy and Merrill felt that the militants' quest for their own sense of justice and fairness had jeopardized the long-term viability of the plant. These declarations of blame can be dismissed as overly simplistic, but they do confirm the importance of internal divisions in the experience of Morrell-Ottumwa workers after the early 1950s. Cultural homogeneity and a common sense of community experience had given the early local union much of its strength. That underpinning eroded in the face of Morrell's continued onslaught on workers' power within the plant, the company's recruitment of rural w^orkers who were primarily concemed with putting bread on the table rather than battling an unjust company, and struggles between men and women over declining job opportunities in the face of massive changes in the industry. As a result, Morrell-Ottumwa's workers lost not only their militant union but their jobs as well.
